SEG wrote: ↑
Sat May 11, 2019 10:11 pm
The point has already been made that Lewis was deceptive in deliberately withholding crucial contradictory information to neophytes in order not to muddy them with dirt. That's clear deception on the part of the author and is separate from anything that I may or may not have disclosed.
Moonwood the Hare wrote: ↑
Sun May 12, 2019 10:59 am
And it leaves the issue that you were that fervent in your opposition to deception that you tried to deceive us. Now you can say, as many people would, that you have very high standards but fall short of them yourself, or you can say that showing Lewis to be deceptive was so important it became okay to deceive us in order to do so but it puts you on very shaky ground morally.
Point taken. But if you set my indiscretion aside, you are still left with Lewis hiding other Christian points of conflict away to advance his cause.
You declaring that he doesn't clear his fawning obsession with an invisible entity. If it is not clear to you that he wasn't convinced from the start, then you are being deceptive yourself.
You are confusing two different things. If one argues from a presupposition then the presupposition becomes a foundation for the argument. That is quite different from arguing for something which you pressupose in the sense of already believing to be the case. One can present a case using sound arguments whether or not one believes it be the case.
So if you believe anything is true, as long as it has sound arguments it is ok? Say someone asked you to attend a meeting where a cult is planning to pretend to sacrifice a man's son to appease the god Nfluti. The leader wants to know if the father's faith is strong enough to obey. So it goes ahead and right at the last moment the terrified son is spared by the leader pulling back the father just before the father kills his son. Or you are invited to watch a dictator actually torture and kill his only son in a public square because the dictator believes that will cure the Earth's problems with sin before his own god. Or he swore an oath to his god that he would kill the first person he saw walk through the door (which turns out to be his innocent daughter) like Jephthah did in Judges? Would these arguments hold and be solid? Would you accept the invitation or reject the offers and consider the cult is crazy and dangerous?
Argument 2. He never gives a definition of a god
Nothing in his argument needs one.
Then what is this "Something" that he is banging on about, and why does it have to point to his own god?
He is a romantic. He is trying to make strange the familiar so as to make familiar the strange. It's an exercise in the discipined use of imagination; a perfectly legitemate technique
Why can't this "Something" align with an atheist worldview then? IOW, why can't this "Something" just be a social construct? Why leap to the supernatural when there is no viable evidence for it?
Argument 3. He doesn't give a reason how his Moral Law escapes the Euthyphro dilemma
This is not relevant to his argument.
SEG wrote: ↑
Sat May 11, 2019 10:11 pm
It is because it eliminates God as the source of morality. Humans could be the source by their societal interactions.
Lewis is a Christian neoplatonist. Plato and his followers locate morality in the realm of the forms, specificaly in aspirations towards the form of the good. in the Timeaus he describes how the demiurge uses the forms which are static and eternal as a model for the material cosmos. Christian neoplatonists see the forms, which are eternal and self existent, as being located in the mind of God. The Euthyphro dilemma really concerns the role of the gods of paganism, they exist within the cosmos and although they may make moral commands and be seen as the source of social morality they cannot be the origin of those commands in the same way the God of neoplatonism can. I think Lewis tackles the question you are raising in the section beginning:
I fully agree that we learn the Rule of Decent Behaviour from parents and teachers, and friends and books, as we learn everything else. But some of the things we learn are mere conventions which might have been different—we learn to keep to the left of the road, but it might just as well have been the rule to keep to the right—and others of them, like mathematics, are real truths. The question is to which class the Law of Human Nature belongs.
Again, why invoke the supernatural when there are secular explanations?
Argument 4. His Moral Law describes what human beings ought to do, which invokes the is/ought problem.
How does he know the mind of God in what we ought to do?
The is/ought problem strikes me as a pseudo problem. Hume is right in saying we cannot deduce an ought from an is but we can use induction or the hypothetico-decuctive method and we do so all the time. For example we know what temperature human blood ought to be and we know that from observation of what is. People can and do dervive ought from is and what people are saying when they say people cannot derive ought from is is that people ought not to do so, but in doing that they are breaking the very rule they are proposing. Lewis thinks, and I agree, that we have moral intuitions and he is arguing that the best is explanation for these is the existence of a divine lawgiver.
These moral intuitions may be seen from an evolutionary view. Why can't that be the best explanation? Or even if you move away from that and accept the supernatural, why does it have
to be the Christian god? Why not some other god or even gods?
An argument to best explanation works in so far as people come to see that this really is the best explanation from the ones on the table, it is never a matter of strict proof. Hence he is arguing that we encounter God in out moral intuitions. If the argument works then that is the reason why he believes this is the case. In itself that falls somewhere short of knowledge and you are quite right to point that out.
Cool, so it really may be the god Nfluti working in the background?
Premise One: If a compassionate God exists, then he would do things just as a compassionate person would.
Premise Two: God doesn't do things as a compassionate person would.
Conclusion: Therefore, a compassionate God does not exist.