Not Just the One Reason...

[Keep The Reason]

Maybe others will find this an interesting topic.

I often get the sense that theists mistakenly believe the atheist's method (or journey) to conclude for atheism is based on some one, specific argument against theism, and that argument is the one argument that, by itself, topples all of theistic assertion. This is far from the truth and I'm wondering what others' experience on this.

I think of my conclusion that theism is not a truthful way to look at the facts of existence from a broad palette of different spokes, all of which lead to the conclusion that there is no god(s). It's a lot like evolution in that sense; it's not just the fossils, or just the genetics, or just various dating techniques, but rather it's a holistic convergence of information that when put together unravels a lot of the problems with the idea of life being as diverse as it is. This includes seemingly unconnected sciences as well, like astronomy and chemistry. Simply taken together, evolution comes out as a very stable and justified conclusion.

Ahteism vis a vis theism is much the same. I disbelieve in god not just because he's undemonstrable, or unneeded, or the literature is very much like mythology, or that humans cannot agree on his nature, or that a supernatural realm offered as a way to epxlain a natural realm merely creates another realm that cannot be deciphered, or that there's no free will in a universe authored by an omniscient god, or that an omniscient author defines existence as his solipsism, or that prayer doesn't work in any way outside of normal placebo results would indicate, or that there have been countless gods, most of whom have now been discarded, or that heaven and hell motifs are unjust and cruel, or that god's laws are somewhat crazy and miss key issues relating to the dignity of men, women and children, or that it's unethical to demand belief in a premise else be punished for eternity, or that gods weren't satisfactory explanations for more superstitious, technologicially ignorant, and culturally more primitive humans, or that the texts are clearly translations and show no specific or unique divinity that's not accounted for by anything more surprising than the fact that they are lauded by millions over generations...

...None of these alone leads me to reject theism, but taken together they paint a picture of a reality bereft of such beings. I just find it odd that when we discuss these various complaints atheists have with theism, each argument is looked at as the argument. When-- it's really that there are many many arguments converging on one inescapable conclusion (inescapable for me, that is. You may --and many do-- differ).

[gary_s]

Anyone who suggests that there is one single issue or one particular path from theism to atheism, simply has not traveled that path. It is as not a straight and narrow path and often includes many diversions. It's usually the case that atheists/agnostics never intended to follow such a path and quite often the case that they tried NOT to follow such a path. If any Christian is unsure about these remarks, then they should take the time to discuss it with a variety of non-believers. That's the only way to know what they experienced. I've always been confused by the fact that Christians take offense at a non-believer's reasoning when many ideas that one considers on his way toward atheism that are complimentary of theism. To me, the way to non-belief included a deep indulgence in belief and a respect for the ability of some to accept some things on faith. The fact that those same things do not fit with my understanding shouldn't be offensive to them.

I liken this phenomenon with a sports fan's obsession with his team. A team that means nothing to me but has millions of fans wins the championship and they are elated. My indifference is actually offensive to them, as bizarre as that seems to me.

[Rian]

Anyone who suggests that there is one single issue or one particular path from theism to atheism, simply has not traveled that path.

Well, just to be complete, I'd say that there might be people that have one single issue that made them an atheist, although there certainly isn't one particular path. But then re-reading your first sentence, I'm thinking you meant more that there isn't one single issue that every atheist has left theism over (i.e., the same issue); that's what you meant, right?

[gary_s]

Yes, that's precisely what I meant, no one issue describes why people change religions, nor is there one path they all take, although there are certainly common reasons/paths.

[Moonwood the Hare]

A friend of mine who was an atheist used to despise Richard Dawkins for thinking the right thing for ridiculous teleological reasons; this was back in the nineties long before The God Delusion. I would have though it was like watching the sun come up over a landscape, and eventually you had a pattern that made sense of it. Some Christian conversions are like that especially for people who have been sceptics others are much more sudden.

[Kiwi]

I often get the sense that theists mistakenly believe the atheist's method (or journey) to conclude for atheism is based on some one, specific argument against theism, and that argument is the one argument that, by itself, topples all of theistic assertion. This is far from the truth and I'm wondering what others' experience on this.

I've certainly found this in my conversations with my Christian friends. However, I wonder if I don't make the same mistake in reverse at times. I ride in on my war horse of early Canaanite paganism (for example) and expect it to knock out all of the opposition single handedly. It never does. (And, to be fair, my war horses don't get out much.) Beliefs on both sides are the sum of many multi-faceted reasons, I suspect. Even if not all of them make much sense to the other party they still add up to a greater whole. That's certainly the case for my non-belief.

That's the reasonable approach. My first reaction is to agree wholeheartedly that many Christians have an over-simplistic view of how people leave their faith. This whole topic fascinates me. I am convinced that very few Christians can accept the defection of a fellow believer without trying to write it off as the consequence of sin or a flawed belief system or pride or other such excuses. If I believe absolutely in God’s existence and you have left your vibrant faith, there is no scenario that allows me to accept that you have made a reasonable decision to deconvert. Therefore I have to find a way to explain away the process that led you to your conclusion, to invalidate it. Unfair but true, I suspect.

[Rian]

My first reaction is to agree wholeheartedly that many Christians have an over-simplistic view of how people leave their faith.

And I feel that many atheists have an over-simplistic view of why people choose their religious beliefs or keep their religious beliefs. I guess it's just hard to explain some things. But the atheists have it a little easier - they can always just say that they don't see God.

[Keep The Reason]

That reminds me, Rian-- you don't seem to be inclined to answer this over at the "God: Man or Woman?" thread, but given what you say here in this thread, it's also appropriate to ask you:

Where are you on the scale of belief? I'm a #6.

1. Strong theist. 100 percent possibility of God. In the words of C.G. Jung, 'I do not believe, I know.'

2. Very high probability but short of 100 per cent. De facto theist. 'I cannot know for certain, but I strongly believe in God and live my life on the assumption that he is there."

3. Higher than 50 per cent but not very high. Technically agnostic but leaning towards theism. 'I am very uncertain, but I am inclined to believe in God.'

4. Exactly 50 per cent. Completely impartial agnostic. 'God's existence and non-existence are exactly equiprobable.'

5. Lower than 50 per cent but not very low. Technically agnostic but leaning towards atheism. 'I don't know whether God exists but I'm inclined to be sceptical.'

6. Very low probability, but short of zero. De facto atheist. 'I cannot know for certain but I think God is very improbable, and I live my life on the assumption that he is not there.'

7.Strong atheist. 'I know there is no God, with the same conviction as Jung 'knows' there is one.

[Moonwood the Hare]

That reminds me, Rian-- you don't seem to be inclined to answer this over at the "God: Man or Woman?" thread, but given what you say here in this thread, it's also appropriate to ask you:

Where are you on the scale of belief? I'm a #6.

1. Strong theist. 100 percent possibility of God. In the words of C.G. Jung, 'I do not believe, I know.'

2. Very high probability but short of 100 per cent. De facto theist. 'I cannot know for certain, but I strongly believe in God and live my life on the assumption that he is there."

3. Higher than 50 per cent but not very high. Technically agnostic but leaning towards theism. 'I am very uncertain, but I am inclined to believe in God.'

4. Exactly 50 per cent. Completely impartial agnostic. 'God's existence and non-existence are exactly equiprobable.'

5. Lower than 50 per cent but not very low. Technically agnostic but leaning towards atheism. 'I don't know whether God exists but I'm inclined to be sceptical.'

6. Very low probability, but short of zero. De facto atheist. 'I cannot know for certain but I think God is very improbable, and I live my life on the assumption that he is not there.'

7.Strong atheist. 'I know there is no God, with the same conviction as Jung 'knows' there is one.

I think the Dawkins scale is a piece of nonsense for the following and other reasons which I have shared before
I thought that was one of the weakest parts of Dawkins book. The problems I have with it are:
1. He treats religious belief as a scientific hypothesis. This makes some sense if one regards a hypothesis as a type of belief or a belief as a type of hypothesis but are they really the same?
2. Dawkins knows that religious belief is not really a scientific hypothesis. It was pointed out to him in an exchange with Mike Poole many years ago. Poole pointed out that he was skipping between regarding religious belief as a hypothesis and not doing so as for example when he tried to distinguish the many worlds theory of quantum mechanics from religious belief by saying it is a scientific theory not a religious belief. Dawkins has never taken this point on board
3. He is assuming that in order to be valid any belief must be testable in the way a scientific hypothesis must be testable. He never states this let alone defends it but his argument makes no sense without this assumption. But this is plainly not the case.
4. He uses the concept of probability in a very ambiguous way. He talks about theories having probabilities which can be described using percentages but he never indicates how he would assess the percentage of probability he would ascribe to any theory. If he has found a method for doing this the scientific community would love to know about it! But of course he hasn't and so when he assess the probability of something being true he means he is making an informed judgement. This is after he has said a few pages earlier that we should not make such judgements which he calls gut judgements.
5. He ignores the logical asymmetry of affirmation and denial. This is a very central point in twentieth century philosophy of science and it seems bizarre he would overlook it. To explain with an example. Suppose there are two people one of whom claims there is a cat in a certain house and one who claims there is probably not. The one who claims there is a cat does so because he is standing in the house holding the cat. The one who says there is probably not does so because he has just made a thorough search of the house and found no cat. Clearly the second is right in his probability claim and the first is right in his certainty claim. (I should also add that if I am certain there is a cat because I am experiencing it I do not become more certain if you walk into the room and I show you the cat. My certainty does not increase because I can demonstrate what I experience to you. So I think the attempt to ground the validity of experiential justification on demonstrability fails.)
6. It is not clear whether Dawkins is talking about psychological confidence that a belief is true or warranted certainty. Again he seems to exploit this ambiguity.

I also think his misunderstanding of Jung is quite funny when taken in context.

[gary_s]

And I feel that many atheists have an over-simplistic view of why people choose their religious beliefs or keep their religious beliefs. I guess it's just hard to explain some things. But the atheists have it a little easier - they can always just say that they don't see God.

There tends to be a rather punitive component to the thinking of many an atheist. You could even call it arrogant. The process of losing any belief in the supernatural tends to accompany a great deal of learning of new information and this likely leads to a feeling of superior intellect and a lessening of respect for those that hold on to those "old" beliefs. Call it a syndrome of "I figured it out so why can't everyone else". I'm a little sad when I see this lack of compassion for people with different ideas. But I don't think it's so much because one can't explain one's belief as it is another person's inability to understand it, and this of course works both ways. But it seems equally ignorant to say that the atheist has anything easy just because they don't "see" god. Especially for an atheist who was raised from birth to "see" this god; the complexity of thinking that must occur to reject that training is profound and should not be trivialized by anyone.

[Aaron]

This makes some sense if one regards a hypothesis as a type of belief or a belief as a type of hypothesis but are they really the same?

C.S. Lewis seems to have felt that they weren't. I wouldn't mind if you hashed this out a little bit more, if you want. I don't think they are the same either, but I don't think I can state that in a clear concise way and a discussion on it might help with that.

He ignores the logical asymmetry of affirmation and denial.

You talk a lot about this concept. Where I'm getting stuck is the fact that you're assuming the person holding the cat is able to positively confirm that he is holding the cat. While I don't want to be silly, this really can't be true in any absolute sense right? I just have to wonder, isn't everything actually known in the second sense when we really get down to it? (as C.S. Lewis wrote in Miracles, "seeing is not believing").

Anyways I'd like to hear what you think about these two issues. Thanks Moonwood.

[Keep The Reason]

There tends to be a rather punitive component to the thinking of many an atheist. You could even call it arrogant. The process of losing any belief in the supernatural tends to accompany a great deal of learning of new information and this likely leads to a feeling of superior intellect and a lessening of respect for those that hold on to those "old" beliefs. Call it a syndrome of "I figured it out so why can't everyone else". I'm a little sad when I see this lack of compassion for people with different ideas. But I don't think it's so much because one can't explain one's belief as it is another person's inability to understand it, and this of course works both ways. But it seems equally ignorant to say that the atheist has anything easy just because they don't "see" god. Especially for an atheist who was raised from birth to "see" this god; the complexity of thinking that must occur to reject that training is profound and should not be trivialized by anyone.

Let's say that this does comprise some % of atheists. Even if that's the case what's surprising is not that there are some, but there are very few who are going around with such a chip.

While I have definite conclusions and ideas that I voice here, I don't walk up and down the streets vocalizing that somehow "I've gotten it and you losers haven't" -- or anything even close to that (I don't even actually think it).

Meanwhile, I live in a culture where every few blocks is yet another church with yet another sign telling me how lost I am without god, and how only with Jesus can I be forgiven for being evil or sinful, and the message is out on the airwaves in an amazing number of ways, and none of it's couched in terms of "well maybe..." -- in fact, it's all stated as de facto truth. Even my cash makes a statement about in whom or what I trust.

But furthermore, if I announce my valid conclusions of such beliefs, I'm immediately tagged as criticizing negatively, whereas the theist can do this with hardly a ripple. And often, even atheists will defend theists (or remain silent) when theists are arrogant, and yet immediately jump to criticize a fellow atheist for adopting any tones of finality. I think this comes from upbringing and the incredibly false belief that religious ideology somehow is out of bounds for such criticism. So if I say that I consider all of Abrahamic theism to be a mythology, I'm accused of disrespecting someone's beliefs, which is meant as some idea that I'm disrespecting the person. If those same people hear the theist tell me that without Jesus, I'm unreconciled to god and deserve whatever fate awaits me (and it's never a happy fate), then nothing is said.

So it's not surprising that a little arrogance might be coming from those who have shrugged off these beliefs. And when atheists start going door to door confronting people ikn their homes with their beliefs, then I'll start to think it's a bit much. But until then, all we do is voice our words.

[Keep The Reason]

This makes some sense if one regards a hypothesis as a type of belief or a belief as a type of hypothesis but are they really the same?

C.S. Lewis seems to have felt that they weren't. I wouldn't mind if you hashed this out a little bit more, if you want. I don't think they are the same either, but I don't think I can state that in a clear concise way and a discussion on it might help with that.

He ignores the logical asymmetry of affirmation and denial.

You talk a lot about this concept. Where I'm getting stuck is the fact that you're assuming the person holding the cat is able to positively confirm that he is holding the cat. While I don't want to be silly, this really can't be true in any absolute sense right? I just have to wonder, isn't everything actually known in the second sense when we really get down to it? (as C.S. Lewis wrote in Miracles, "seeing is not believing").

Anyways I'd like to hear what you think about these two issues. Thanks Moonwood.

I pursued this in a different thread, here

[Moonwood the Hare]

This makes some sense if one regards a hypothesis as a type of belief or a belief as a type of hypothesis but are they really the same?

C.S. Lewis seems to have felt that they weren't. I wouldn't mind if you hashed this out a little bit more, if you want. I don't think they are the same either, but I don't think I can state that in a clear concise way and a discussion on it might help with that.

Obstinacy in Belief is one of the best things Lewis wrote much more mature than say Mere Christianity which is quite triumphalist. I see it as a rebuttal of Flew's Theology and Falsification which I have been encouraging people here to read online. Flew's paper was originally delivered to the Socratic Club at Oxford as was Lewis's paper though there is a gap of five years between them. I think a religious belief is based on an experience of something as divine or self existent. I think there are good reasons for thinking this kind of belief cannot be the product of argument or inference.

He ignores the logical asymmetry of affirmation and denial.

You talk a lot about this concept. Where I'm getting stuck is the fact that you're assuming the person holding the cat is able to positively confirm that he is holding the cat. While I don't want to be silly, this really can't be true in any absolute sense right? I just have to wonder, isn't everything actually known in the second sense when we really get down to it? (as C.S. Lewis wrote in Miracles, "seeing is not believing").

Anyways I'd like to hear what you think about these two issues. Thanks Moonwood.

Well Lewis takes the view, common in his day especially among rationalistic atheists like Russell, that we experience certain sensations and infer the existence of a world of objects. I think this is a mistake and we directly experience a world of objects. And Lewis has to concede that autobiographically none of us start from sensations and then infer a world. It is possible at least in principle to doubt that a world of objects exists but to me that just means that the existence of the world is not indubitable. I actually think Descartes was on a false scent in identifying the knowable with the indubitable. A key figure in defending the idea of a common sense view that an external world exists was G E. Moore and the later Wittgenstein adopted many of his ideas. In some of his later writing Lewis touches on the idea that solipsism which had been taken seriously in his youth was now seen as a category error and philosophers like Victor Reppert who want to make use of Lewis's ideas have to distance themselves from what now seems like an eccentric view of perception.

[gary_s]

Meanwhile, I live in a culture where every few blocks is yet another church with yet another sign telling me how lost I am without god, and how only with Jesus can I be forgiven for being evil or sinful, and the message is out on the airwaves in an amazing number of ways, and none of it's couched in terms of "well maybe..." -- in fact, it's all stated as de facto truth. Even my cash makes a statement about in whom or what I trust.

But furthermore, if I announce my valid conclusions of such beliefs, I'm immediately tagged as criticizing negatively, whereas the theist can do this with hardly a ripple. And often, even atheists will defend theists (or remain silent) when theists are arrogant, and yet immediately jump to criticize a fellow atheist for adopting any tones of finality. I think this comes from upbringing and the incredibly false belief that religious ideology somehow is out of bounds for such criticism. So if I say that I consider all of Abrahamic theism to be a mythology, I'm accused of disrespecting someone's beliefs, which is meant as some idea that I'm disrespecting the person. If those same people hear the theist tell me that without Jesus, I'm unreconciled to god and deserve whatever fate awaits me (and it's never a happy fate), then nothing is said.

So it's not surprising that a little arrogance might be coming from those who have shrugged off these beliefs. And when atheists start going door to door confronting people ikn their homes with their beliefs, then I'll start to think it's a bit much. But until then, all we do is voice our words.

What region of the country do you live in? I know the South is chock full of these kinds of attitudes and yes, they can be quite oppressive. People actually expect you to be Christian, Conservative and straight. Being white is a big plus as well. Revealing that you don't fit these categories can shock some people and reduce the degree that they trust you. But its important not to retaliate in a like fashion. I'd like to live in a city full of atheists who would warmly welcome a Christian and perhaps attend church with them while they were in town. I mainly like this idea because I'd love to visit a Christian city where people didn't gasp when I told them I don't believe in god or Christ or the Holy Ghost. And perhaps they might sleep in on Sunday while I visited and take a walk around the neighborhood in their shorts while everyone else is dressed up for church.